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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST CIRCUIT

Mufioz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
LAW: According to § 208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), "[a]liens seeking asylum
are entitled to basic procedural protections and to a fair hearing, but
not to a letter-perfect one."
In deciding what constitutes
"fundamental fairness" in an immigration hearing, the immigration
judge (IJ) has wide boundaries in which to decide the case.
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Mufioz-Monsalve tried to enter the
United States illegally in 2001 by using his brother's passport. He
was apprehended at a Miami airport and stated that his motivation to
enter the U.S. was because he was unemployed in his native
Colombia and wanted to work. He also said that he had been having
trouble with a "paramilitary guerilla group" called the National
Liberation Army (ELN). He told two different immigration officials
that his interactions with the ELN revolved around the fact that the
ELN was trying to extort money out of him. The matter was referred
to an IJ,
and subsequently, the Petitioner changed his story regarding
his involvement with the ELN. He now stated that he was a Liberal
Party activist in Columbia and ELN members had ordered him to
stop his political involvement and give them money. Petitioner paid
the money, but did not halt his political affiliations. The IJ found the
inconsistencies in petitioner's testimony to be incredible and ordered
for his removal from the U.S. The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denied the petitioner's appeal, and his petition for judicial
review to this court was granted.
ANALYSIS: The Court divided its analysis into three parts. The
first argument advanced by petitioner is that the IJ should have
demanded a competency evaluation; thus, due to the lack of the
evaluation, the IJ deprived petitioner of his due process rights. The
Court rejected this argument and stated that while every illegal alien
is entitled to a trial with basic procedural requirements, the trial
conducted does not have to be absolutely perfect. The only
requirement is that the trial must be conducted under the guise of
"fundamental fairness."
This means "the alien must have a
meaningful opportunity to resent evidence and be heard by an
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impartial judge."
If an alien is incompetent, then additional
safeguards are provided for them. In this case, however, the issue of
competency was never raised; therefore, a claim of incompetency is
weak at best. In addition, when a claim for the violation of due
process is brought, the petitioner must show that his claim was
prejudiced by the failure of a competency determination. The Court
did not find prejudice in petitioner's claim, and thus rejected this first
argument.
Petitioner next advanced an argument of credibility. When an
alien is seeking asylum, his or her own credible testimony may be
enough to prove that he or she is a refugee seeking asylum for fear of
future persecution on account of certain characteristics. The IJ,
however, still has the right to analyze this testimony and its
credibility, as well as to require corroboration of the testimony. The
court stated that when the petitioner's testimony is inconsistent the
testimony will likely be "sharply discounted" by the IJ. Thus, the
Court agreed with the IJ's reasoning and rejected the petitioner's
credibility argument.
Petitioner last argument revolved around his inability to
immediately appeal the IJ's decision to the BIA because the
transcript of the master calendar conference was missing. In order to
uphold this claim, the missing materials must relate to a material
matter in the petitioner's case and the absence of the materials must
be prejudicial to the overall case. The court determined that the
record of the trial was substantially complete and the absence of the
master calendar conference did not prejudice the petitioner.
HOLDING: The Court of Appeals upheld the BIA's decision to
remove petitioner from the country and deny him asylum status. The
Court reasoned that the petitioner's due process rights were not
violated nor was he prejudiced during the initial trial before the U.
IMPACT: The case simply emphasized the importance of aliens
telling the truth when they are first questioned upon entering the
country. This decision represents the unique situation when an alien
tells conflicting stories of his reasons for entering the country
illegally to various government officials. This decision has the
potential to impact the granting of asylum stays for illegal aliens who
have inconsistent stories.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT

Linares Huarcava v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 224 (2nd Cir. 2008).
LAW: 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) was amended in 1994 by Congress in
order to allow aliens who entered the United States without a proper
inspection, but met certain standards to pay a penalty fee and change
their alien status. To be eligible for this adjustment, aliens had to
prove they either had "a visa petition or labor certificate filed on their
behalf," which was "approvable when filed" on or before April 30,
2001. "Approvable when filed' means that the filed petition was "(1)
properly filed, (2) meritorious in fact and (3) non-frivolous."
FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro Linares Huarcaya, while residing
in his native Peru, dated a girl named Ruth for some eight years, yet
fathered children with two other women. Ruth left Peru to live in
the United States in 1998 and Huarcaya joined her in 2000, and
entered the country without inspection. They were married on March
31, 2000, and Ruth filed an 1-130 visa petition for Huarcaya one
month after their marriage. They later divorced on March 4. 2000.
Ruth's visa petition was denied on March 8, 2004. Shortly after,
Huarcaya married an American named Lucy and she also filed an I130 on his behalf. Lucy's petition was approved and Huarcaya filed
an 1-485 in order to seek adjustment of his status. The United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), however, denied his I485 application, stating that Huarcaya had failed to file evidence
showing that his first marriage was bona fide, and that he failed to
show that Ruth's first 1-130 petition was -approvable when filed."
Huarcaya sought review of his denial at an immigration hearing. The
IJ upheld the denial of the petition, because Huarcaya had failed to
show that his first marriage was bona fide. Huarcaya then appealed
to the BIA. While the appeal was being filed, the BIA ruled on a
similar case in In re Riero. In that case, the BIA held that "in order
for a visa petition to be 'approvable when filed' in this context, there
must be a showing that the marriage on which it is based was bona
fide." The BIA upheld the IJ's decision regarding Huarcaya. citing
Riero, and stating that Ruth lacked certain pertinent information,

which any wife in a would know about her husband. Huarcaya
appealed.
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ANALYSIS: The Court first dealt with Huarcaya's argument that
the construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) in Riero is not entitled to
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence
Council, Inc. Instead of the petition's bona fide requirement for the
marriage, Huarcaya argued that the only thing that the petition must
show is the establishment of a prima facie case, because this showing
is the only way to give "content to both the terms 'non-frivolous' and
'meritorious in fact."' Chevron deference requires the Court to
determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue" and "unambiguously expressed its intent." The
Court first recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) referenced in Riero, is
silent on the question at issue and then turned to the second
requirement. The Court said that the BIA's interpretation of the
statute was reasonable in light of the circumstances. The requirement
that the marriage be bona fide is consistent with the statute's
requirement that the visa petition be "approvable when filed." After
proceeding through this analysis, the Court then determined that
Chevron deference is not applicable here because the BIA is not
interpreting a congressional statute, but, instead, is interpreting its
own statute. Thus under Auer v. Robbins, Auer deference is
applicable. Under Auer, "an agency's interpretations [of its own
regulations] are entitled to deference and are 'controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' The Court
recognized that "approvable when filed" is ambiguous in nature and
its qualifying terms of "non-frivolous" and "meritorious in fact" did
nothing to cure the ambiguities.
In addition, Huarcaya argued that both the statute and the
interpretation violated due process because they are "void for
vagueness." The Court held that Huarcaya failed to establish that the
statute's provision was vague as it applied to him. In order to
establish a claim of vagueness, a court must first decide whether or
not a reasonable person would be able to determine what is
prohibited by the statute at issue and then "whether the law provides
explicit standards for those who apply it." In this case, Huarcaya was
provided with what the BIA needed in order to prove that the
marriage was bona fide and that the petition for a visa based on
marriage always carried with it the requirement that the marriage not
be fake.
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HOLDING: The Court upheld the BIA's denial of Huarcaya's I485 petition to change his immigration status.
IMPACT: This decision has the impact of discouraging an alien
enter into marriage in order to obtain a visa, a specific citizenship
status, or change of immigration status. Now, the alien must prove
that the marriage was bona fide and was not entered into for the sole
purpose of obtaining a visa.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Khrystotodorov v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2008).
LAW: 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) vests the power in the Attorney
General (AG) to grant asylum to a refugee, which is defined as a
person who either chooses not to return or is unwilling to return to
his native country because of fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (b)(3)(A) provides that a withholding of removal can be granted
by the AG if they determine that the "applicant's life or freedom
would be threatened in his home country because of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." The Convention Against Torture (CAT) provides
that an asylum applicant can obtain relief if they can demonstrate
"that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
returned" to their home country.
FACTS: Mykola Mykolayevich Khrystotodorov, his wife
Oksana, and his daughter Viktoriya entered the United States in 1999
as nonimmigrant visitors. They overstayed their visit and subsequent
removal proceedings were instituted in June 2001. During the
proceedings, they conceded their removability and filed an
application for asylum and relief under CAT. They asserted that they
had suffered religious persecution in their native Ukraine and they
had a "well-founded fear" of continuing persecution if they were to
return. Mykola described various incidents at a hearing before an
immigration judge (IJ) which supported his claim that his family had
suffered persecution at the hands of the Ukranian National
Assembly-Ukranian National Self Defence (UNA-UNSO) because of
their religion.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ provided extra time for
Khrystotodorov to obtain needed documents proving that the UNAUNSO was actually tied to the Ukranian government and medical
documentation describing his injuries.
After 18 months,
Khrystotodorov offered some medical evidence, but no evidence
which would have proven any governmental involvement with the
UNA-UNSO.
The IJ said that there was a lack of corroboration,
noting that the provided records did not clearly indicate that the
injuries Khrystotodorov suffered. Moreover, there was a "significant
variance" between Khrystotodorov's testimony and the country
background reports. The BIA agreed with the IJ and the petitioners
appealed.
ANALYSIS: The Court began the opinion with a brief discussion
of the law and recognizes that in order for a refugee to be granted
CAT relief, the torture that is more likely than not to be suffered has
to come at the hands of a public official. Moreover, the likelihood of
"torture" contains abuse that is more severe than that of a simple fear
of persecution.
Petitioner's first argument challenged the U's ruling that the
provided documents required credibility.
In order to establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, the refugee's fear of
persecution must be "both subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable" and must be established with "credible, direct, and
specific" evidence. The IJ stated that the corroboration was needed
in three specific areas of Khrystotodorov's testimony: (1) evidence
concerning UNA-UNSO's ties to the government and evidence of
their actual abuse of Baptists; (2) corroboration of the anti-UNAUNSO's rally; and (3) more specific evidence requiring the physical
harm of Khrystotodorov. With respect to the first two reservations,
the Court re-examined the country reports and found no substantial
evidence that the UNA-UNSO specifically targeted Baptists for
violence or that they had any ties to the Ukranian government.
Moreover, there were no widespread reports of violent activities by
the UNA-UNSO.
There was concern over the validity of the
signatures on the medical records from the hospital regarding his
apparent nine-day hospital stay. Thus, the IJ did not ignore this
evidence, but simply required additional corroboration to assess its
validity.
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In addition, the Court recognized that Khrystotodorov's
testimony was not enough to sustain his burden of proof, because the
inconsistencies reasonably shed doubt on the validity of his
testimony. Khrystotodorov's argued that the introduction of new
evidence was improperly denied by the IJ. The Court said that it was
not unsympathetic to petitioner's hardships in researching
information. Moreover, the petitioner was given eighteen months by
the IJ in order to uncover the additional corroborating evidence.
HOLDING: The Court agreed with the IJ and BIA and denied
the petition of judicial review to reopen the case and vacated the
ordered temporary stay.
IMPACT: This decision does not adversely affect a refugee's
chances of being granted asylum in the United States. It simply
emphasizes that actual evidence of feared persecution or torture must
be shown. A refugee should be prepared to show corroborating
evidence of one's testimony and must be prepared to meet the higher
burden of proof required in the withholding of removal.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT

Fones4All Corp. v. FCC, 550 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2008).
LAW: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) the authority to require that
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) provide competitive local
exchange carriers (CLECs) "access to network elements on an
unbundled basis." Regulation § 51.319(d) allows ILECs "to disavow
any contractual obligations for unbundled access to mass market
switching."
FACTS: Fones4All Corporation (Fones4All) filed a petition for
forbearance seeking relief from regulation §51.319(d) within the
applicable time period. The FCC's chief of the Wireline Competition
Bureau (WCB) granted an extension of 90 days in which to hear
Fones4All's petition, as provided under the applicable statutes.
Fones4All filed an application for extension, contending that the
WCB did not have the power to grant such an extension. The FCC
took no action on the application for extension and denied
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The FCC issued its
Fones4All's petition for forbearance.
"Memorandum Opinion and Order" one day after the maximum
allowable one year plus 90 days deadline. The petition was denied
on the grounds that it was "procedurally defective." Fones4All
appealed the decision.
ANALYSIS: The first issue was the backdating of the FCC's
order. It was recognized that Fones4All did not raise the issue
directly to the FCC; instead, they first raised the issue in this judicial
action. Fones4All claimed that any attempt to raise the issue to the
FCC would have been futile. However, because the requirement of
"exhaustion of claims" is statutory in nature, and in order to accept
Fones4All's argument, an exception would have to be created. The
Court refused to do this, stating that the FCC must have the chance to
pass on the creation of such an exception before the court can do so.
Even though Fones4All claims that it presented this issue to the FCC
in its application of extension, their presentation did not the
requirement because the issue cannot be implied from the
circumstances and it must be "meaningfully rais[ed]."
Fones4All contended that the WCB did not have the authority to
extend the applicable time period. The statute, however, also gives
the FCC the ability to delegate its functions to its subordinates, as
was the case here.
Fones4All's last argument is that the WCB-granted extension
lacked necessity. The Court also denied this argument, stating that
because of the unique nature of Fones4All's application, it was
necessary to extend the time period.
HOLDING: The court refused to hold that Fones4All's petition
was "deemed granted," because it failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to it.
IMPACT: This case simply emphasized the necessity of parties
exhausting their
administrative
remedies
before
bringing
administrative claims before the judicial branch. The courts will not
entertain any arguments, no matter how prevailing, if the party has
failed to exhaust all of its available administrative remedies.
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Sarei v. Rio Tinto. PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
LAW: The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides United States
courts with jurisdiction "for any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law or nations or a treaty of the
United States."
FACTS: Rio Tinto, PLC, is part of an international mining group
who acquired the operation of a mine on the Papua New Guinea
island of Bougainville. According to the complaint, Rio Tinto
engaged in actions of mass violence and pollution after working with
the Papua New Guinea government to obtain the mining permit.
Some residents on the island sabotaged the mine and forced its
closure.
Rio Tinto demanded the continued assistance of the
government, and the government acquiesced and sent troops. Soon
after, the country descended into a civil war. Rio Tinto couldn't
resume its mining activities, so they threatened to pull out, and the
government instituted mass blockades so that the island's citizens
couldn't receive medicine, food and other necessary items. The war
ended twelve years later, and the plaintiffs brought this action
alleging numerous violations of the ATS. The district court denied
the plaintiffs' claims saying that their complaint had only shown
"nonjusticiable political questions" and that the ATS did not require
"exhaustion of local remedies." On appeal, the court held that the
lower court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claim ended as soon
as the lower court held that the plaintiffs presented nonjusticiable
political questions, and that the ATS does not require exhaustion of
local remedies. The plaintiffs appealed.
ANALYSIS: Under Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme
Court held that exhaustion of local remedies should be considered
with cases brought under the ATS. The court here recognizes that
"[j]udicially-imposed or prudential exhaustion" is not a prerequisite
to jurisdiction, but is one of many factors that can help determine
judicial timing. Under ordinary international law, one state is
normally not required to consider a claim by another state unless all
local remedies have been exhausted. Sovereign countries, however,
may exercise jurisdiction over another through consent. Even though
consent may grant jurisdiction, the principles of comity still explicitly
state that the exhaustion of remedies is a requirement.
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The case at issue involved a foreign corporation's acts on foreign
soil and is only before a United States court (which is not an
international tribunal) because one of the plaintiffs is a permanent
resident. Since the "nexus" is weak, the Court considered exhaustion
principles. The Court cautioned that the burden of proof for
exhaustion lies with the defendant. In addition, a claim has been
exhausted when the appropriate highest entity issued a final warning
or order, not when such action has been initiated.
HOLDING: The Court remanded the case to the district court in
order to determine whether or not an exhaustion requirement should
be imposed.
IMPACT: While some may see this as the United States
judiciary expanding its jurisdiction, it is instead a cautious step
toward ensuring that all claims, such as the ones brought under the
ATS, are before courts only after all other possibilities have been
tried. In this case, the Court decided that exhaustion of local
remedies should be an additional factor considered in claims
involving the ATS. With this additional factor, it may become more
difficult for plaintiffs to win a case in a United States court under the
ATS as it is now implied that local claims should be exhausted.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT

Stewart v. Kempthorne, 554 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2009).
LAW: The Taylor Grazing Act (TGA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r,
provides an all-encompassing plan in order to "administer, improve,
and develop the grazing lands of the United States." The TGA also
invests the power in the Secretary of the Interior to grant grazing
permits. Grazing permits will be given to those applicants who "(1)
own or control land or water base property, and (2) either meet
United States citizenship requirements, or be an entity authorized to
conduct business in the state in which grazing is intended." The
grazing permits specify the "grazing preference, the terms and
conditions, and the duration of the permits."
FACTS: The United States Department of the Interior
established three different allotments for livestock grazing within the
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Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. Regarding the first
allotment entitled the "Clark Bench Allotment," Grand Canyon Trust
and Canyonlands Grazing Company (Canyonlands) entered into an
agreement with Brent Robinson for either the transfer or
relinquishment of his grazing permit over the allotment. The Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) granted them the grazing permits.
Plaintiffs Trevor Stewart, Worth Brown, James Brown, and William
Alleman all sought individual grazing permits on the same allotment
of land after Canyonlands had filed their application. The BLM
denied all of the applications, citing Canyonlands' preference.
Plaintiffs appealed the BLM's denial of their applications, and the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the BLM's denial on the
fact that the BLM had reached its decision on a logical and factual
basis. The district court affirmed the decision of the ALJ and the
plaintiffs appealed.
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals first examined the necessary
qualifications in order to obtain a grazing permit under the TGA.
The Court found that the qualifications were met. The Court agreed
with the ALJ and the district court, in that Canyonlands owned
livestock prior to filing their applications for grazing permits. In its
transaction with O'Driscoll to obtain the "Last Chance Allotment"
preference, they agreed to pay his trespass fees in exchange for
O'Driscoll's remaining four cattle. Plaintiffs argue that this transfer
does not actually constitute ownership of the cattle, in that the cattle
were strays and Utah law claims the strays after attempts to locate the
true owner fail. The Court rejected these claims, holding that the
Plaintiffs could not raise these issues, as they failed to do so in the
lower courts.
The Plaintiffs argued that under the TGA, a permit holder must
have the intent to graze, and Canyonlands did not possess this
requisite intent. The Court disagreed, holding that the only time the
BLM ensures that the land is actually being used for grazing is after
the permit is granted. Moreover, it would be a waste of time for the
government to have to determine the subjective intent of every
grazing permit applicant.
Plaintiffs' argued a lacked standing. The Court recognized that
interveners in an action do not have to establish their own individual
standing as long as they are associated with another party who does
have constitutional standing. In the lower court, however, the
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counties were named as plaintiffs and not as interveners. In order to
have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "an injury in fact," "a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct," and that "it
[is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision." The counties argue that the
issuance of the permits to Canyonlands negatively impacted them
financially, eliminated grazing in the area, and that a decrease in
grazing subsequently decreased the tax revenues.
The Court,
however, could not find a direct injury to the counties due to the
issuance of the grazing permits; at best, a "conjectural" injury may
exist.
HOLDING: The Court of Appeals upheld the BLM's issuance of
grazing permits for the three land allotments to Canyonlands.
IMPACT: The Court's decision may discourage individuals
from seeking grazing permits, as they may feel that they will be
defeated by organizations. Moreover, the Court may have opened the
floodgates by permitting applicants for grazing permits to not
demonstrate an intent to use the land for grazing.
Other
organizations may attempt to obtain grazing land without the intent to
actually use the land for grazing purposes. This would decrease the
amount of grazing land available, and could subsequently decrease
the amount of wild or stray cattle in those areas.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Gre2orv v. First Title of Am., Inc., 555 F.3d 1300 (1 lth Cir.
2009).
LAW: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1), provides that no employee employed by an employer
engaged in interstate commerce can work more than forty hours a
week unless they are compensated for this work at a rate that is no
less than one and a half times the normal pay rate. The FLSA also
contains several exceptions to this provision, including any
employees who are employed in the capacity of an outside
salesperson. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700 provides the definition of an
outside salesperson, as one whose primary duties are obtaining orders
or service contracts for which customers will pay directly for these
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services and as one who must be engaged in business outside the
employer's normal place of business.
FACTS: Bruce Napolitano owns First Title of America, Inc.
(Appellees) and Nelda Gregory (Gregory) was his employee for
approximately six months.
Gregory was initially hired as a
marketing executive, and in the employment agreement, her job
description was "to provide the services for referring and closing title
insurance companies." She was initially paid $1,000 per week, but
was later paid on a commission basis. Gregory also claimed that she
often worked over forty hours per week, but never received any
overtime compensation. Gregory appeals the district court decision,
which said that she fit within the outside salesperson exception to the
FLSA; thus, she was not entitled to compensation.
ANALYSIS: The Court held that a job title alone does not
determine an employee's classification within the FLSA. Instead, an
employee's status is determined based on their salaries and duties,
which will then define their employee status under the FLSA.
Gregory argued that she does not fall within this exception because
she never actually sold title insurance to anyone; her only job was to
promote and market the insurance. In order to support this argument,
she relied on a Department of Labor (DOL) opinion letter, which she
received from the DOL handbook, and Amendola v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.

Appellees argued that due to Gregory's own testimony, she falls
within the outside salesperson exception. Gregory testified that her
primary job purpose was to obtain orders for title insurance and that
she was solely paid on a commission basis. Appellees also point to
Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., in which the court held

that promotional and marketing work that is performed in
conjunction with obtaining orders is exempted work under the FLSA.
The Court applied the "primary duty test," which considers
multiple factors, including: "the relative importance of the exempt
duties; the amount of time spent performing the exempt work; the
employee's relative freedom from direct supervision; and the
relationship between the employee's salary and the wages paid to
other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the
employee." The Court concluded that Gregory's primary duty was to
obtain insurance orders from her employer and that most of her time
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on the clock was spent outside of the office. In addition, Gregory
obtained direct credit for all of her sales, and did not pass off the
sales to another salesperson in order for it to be completed.
Moreover, there were no "intervening sales efforts" once Gregory
had obtained the sale.
HOLDING: The Court upheld the district court's decision that
Gregory fits within the outside salesperson exception in the FLSA;
therefore, Gregory was not entitled to overtime compensation.
IMPACT: This decision expands the definition of an outside
salesperson under the FLSA. Now an outside salesperson can be
defined as someone who seeks sales on behalf of their employer and
who closes the deals themselves without any intervention by a third
party or the employer. The case also emphasizes that how an
employee is defined is based solely on the actual duties performed
and not by what is included in the job description.
Putliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 550 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2009).
LAW: According to 15 U.S.C. § 1703(d) of the Interstate Land
Sales Act (ILSA), a contract or lease for any lot of land that is not
exempt under § 1702 of the ILSA can be revoked at the "option of
the purchaser or lessee for two years from the date of the signing of
such contract or agreement."
§ 1702 of the ILSA has three
subsections which provide for: (a) the exemption of "the sale or lease
of certain properties or 'lots' from the ILSA;" (b) contains the
exemption from the registration and disclosure requirements for
certain lots under ILSA, including those subdivision lots which
contain less than 100 lots; and (c) allows for the creation of other
rules or exemptions for other lots.
FACTS: Plaintiffs filed suit to revoke their contracts with Pukka
Development, Inc. (Pukka) to purchase units in Pukka's 78-unit
complex nearly two years after entering into the agreement under §
1703(d) of ILSA. Pukka believed that the contracts were exempt
from §1703(d) of ILSA and both sides filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted Plaintiffs summary motion and
Pukka appealed.
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ANALYSIS: The Court recognized that both parties agreed that
Pukka's subdivision contains less than 100 lots; thus, they are exempt
from the requirements in § 1702(b) of ILSA. The parties, however,
disagreed on the language of § 1703. Pukka's main argument came
from a letter from Ivy Jackson, Director of the RESPA and Interstate
Land Sales office of the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), supporting Pukka's position that a lot
that is exempt under § 1702 is also exempt from the revocation right
contained in § 1703. The district court disregarded this letter,
reasoning that the court was free to make its own interpretation of the
letter, and did not have to give total deference to agency
interpretation.
The Court of Appeals began its look at the interpretation question
by first looking at the statute's plain language. It is determined that
the statute in § 1702(a) exempts certain lots from all provisions of
ILSA, and thus "serves as a reminder" that some lots are exempt
from all of ILSA's provisions.
Congress, however, has also
explicitly recognized that when a statute has particular language in
one part of a statute, and later excludes it from another part, then the
court must presume that Congress acted intentionally in its omission.
Thus, the Court here disagrees with Plaintiffs argument to add
language to § 1703, stating that they cannot revise a statutory
provision and their only role is to interpret them.
The Court next addressed the ambiguous nature of the statute.
Typically, courts defer to the controlling government agency's
interpretation of the statute so long as the interpretation is
"permissible." HUD is the agency responsible for administering and
promulgating relative rules under ILSA.
Applying Chevron
deference, the Court first recognized that HUD had not directly
addressed the conflict between the two sections, but had addressed it
in past statutes. The previous version of the statute provided that if a
lot of land was exempt under § 1702(b), then it was also exempt from
the revocation provision in § 1703. Thus, HUD's interpretation was
found to be acceptable by the Court.
The Court then addressed whether the deletion of this specific
exemption has the effect of depriving HUD to interpret the statute.
The Court stated that even if Chevron deference was inapplicable in
the interpretation of the prior statute, HUD could gain additional
deference under Skidmore v. Swift.
Deference to an agency's
interpretation under Skidmore is merited "depending upon the
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'thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." The court recognized that Jackson's letter was rationally
analyzed, was consistent with past interpretations of the statute and
was "thoroughly reasoned." Thus, it was entitled to Skidmore
deference.
HOLDING: The Court deferred to HUD's interpretation of §§
1702, 1703 of ILSA, holding that § 1703 means that if any lot or
piece of land is exempt from any provision found in § 1702, then it is
also exempt from the revocation provision found in § 1703.
IMPACT: This case will likely allow any party to a contract, or a
lease for a particular piece of land or a particular lot, to be unable to
revoke the agreement if the piece of land is exempt under any other
provision of ILSA. This may make people more cautious when
entering into contracts or leases for land, as they may want to revoke
the contract if market conditions decline or if other adverse
conditions become apparent.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT

Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 550 F.3d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
LAW: Congress enacted The Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3, in order to encourage the
development of alternative energy and it required utility companies
to purchase their energy from "qualifying facilities." The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was charged with enacting
rules under PURPA. PURPA was amended in 2005 in order to create
exemptions for three types of facilities that did not have to abide by
the statute.
FACTS: In FERC's formal rulemaking process of PURPA, they
interpreted the word "markets" as contained in the Act to contain
both competitive and noncompetitive markets. The American Forest
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and Paper Association (AFPA) believed the interpretation was wrong
and petitioned for review.
ANALYSIS: The Court begins with saying that Chevron
deference must be applied to the FERC's interpretation. First, the
Court must determine whether the language in the statute is
ambiguous and then determine whether the interpretation by the
agency was reasonable. It was recognized that the FERC interpreted
"markets" to include both competitive and non-competitive markets,
and two of the three exemption provisions explicitly provide for the
inclusion of "competitive." The existence of "competitive" in two
exemptions and the absence of it in the last provision, caused the
Court to hold the statute to be ambiguous.
The Court next turned to whether the FERC's interpretation was
reasonable. The FERC's interpretation is consistent with the maxim
that when Congress deliberately excludes a word from a statute in
one section but includes it in another, then Congress acted with
purposeful intent. The interpretation appears to also be consistent
with the widely used definitions, but AFPA argues that the definition
of "market" should solely be limited to being competitive in nature.
The Court disagrees with the AFPA, because the cases they cited to
prove their position only use "competitive" as a modifying word for
market and do not say that all markets must be competitive in nature.
Lastly, the AFPA argues that there must be a factual basis for utilities
to qualify for any of the exemptions. The FERC's determinations in
its final rule are rebuttable presumptions, and the Court finds this to
be acceptable and does not require the FERC to hold case-by-case
adjudications.
HOLDING: The FERC's interpretation of "markets" in PURPA
to include both competitive and noncompetitive markets was upheld
as being reasonable.
IMPACT: This holding by the Court will likely make the
exemptions from abiding by PURPA available to more utilities. The
fact that the exemption will be more widely available may have the
adverse effect of actually decreasing the use of alternative energy,
because fewer utilities will be required to seek it.
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Malladi Drugs & Pharm., Ltd. v. Tandy, 552 F.3d 885 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).

LAW: 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(9) provides that the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) may seize any List I chemical (which include
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine) that have been "imported,
possessed, or acquired in violation" of regulations. The Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 981, provides for an
administrative forfeiture, which has the same effects of a judicial
forfeiture. In order to obtain such forfeiture, the DEA must give
adequate notice to the forfeiting party. Once this notice is provided,
other parties may either choose to go ahead with the administrative
proceedings, or they can file a claim to have the government institute
a judicial forfeiture process.
FACTS: A United States subsidiary of Malladi Drugs and
Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. (Malladi) imported List I chemicals from India
and sold them to Novus Fine Chemicals, LLC and other companies.
Malladi's record-keeping procedures for these List I chemicals were
inspected by DEA agents, and as a result of their reservations, 233
drums of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine were seized. DEA agents
returned five days later and demanded Malladi's surrender of its
DEA import registration and seized 400 drums of ephedrine
hydrochloride, 240 drums of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, and
400 drums of ephedrine. The value of all four of these seizures was
$1,420,000. Malladi was supplied with a letter of notification from
the DEA about its intent to administratively forfeit the seized
chemicals. The letter also provided all of the relevant deadlines and
procedures. Malladi didn't respond and subsequently, the DEA
administratively forfeited the chemicals. Malladi then filed a petition
with the DEA to return the chemicals and their petition was denied.
Malladi then sued the DEA in district court seeking either the return
of the chemicals or the institution of judicial forfeiture proceedings
for the chemicals. The district court granted the DEA's motion to
dismiss, and Malladi appealed.
ANALYSIS: The Court began its analysis by recognizing that
the DEA regulations involving List I chemicals only give two options
to any party who has had its chemicals seized: a petition for
remission and a claim to initiate the process of judicial forfeiture. If
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the party fails to select any of these options by the applicable
deadline, then the DEA can file a default judgment and can
administratively forfeit the chemicals. The Court stated that Malladi
failed to pursue both of these options, even though it was provided
with notices and instead chose to file a discretionary petition.
Because the DEA denied this petition, Malladi now seeks their prior
option of initiating the process of judicial forfeiture for the first time.
The Court, however, states that the failure by Malladi to seek judicial
forfeiture in the initial proceedings subsequently prohibits them from
bringing the judicial forfeiture now. This fact demonstrated that
Malladi did not exhaust its administrative remedies, which is a
prerequisite for obtaining judicial review.
Malladi counters this argument by stating that the normal
exhaustion rules don't apply because this is not a direct appeal from
the administrative decision; instead, it is a collateral attack on the
The Court, however, also
administrative remedy of forfeiture.
rejected this idea, holding that it is not the title of the complaint that
matters, it is the fact that Malladi previously had this option of
choosing the process of judicial forfeiture and they chose not to
pursue it.
HOLDING: The Court upheld the district court's dismissal of
Malladi's claim because Malladi had chosen not to exhaust their
available administrative remedies.
IMPACT: The Court held that in cases involving DEA
regulations, a party appealing the seizure of chemicals, once
receiving notice, must choose an administrative option. If they
choose not to pursue these avenues, then they cannot later try to
obtain these remedies in a judicial proceeding. This seemingly
restricts a party's access to judicial proceedings, and also emphasizes
that the Court will not be a stand-in for the agency, nor will they
contravene their rules and regulations in order to give the party what
they want administratively in a judicial proceeding.
Tesoro Ref. & Mktg Co. v. Fed. Ener2y Regtulatory Comm'n,
552 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
LAW: 18 C.F.R. § 343.2 allows challenges to be brought for
pipeline rates adjusted for inflation under 18 C.F.R. § 343.3.
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FACTS: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
issued an order approving Calnev Pipe Line's increase in the rates
they charged, adjusted for inflation. Tesoro Refining and Marketing
Company (Tesoro) sought review of the FERC's order, focusing on
the difference in "revenues over cost of service." The FERC denied
Tesoro's petition, following its clarification of an earlier order. The
FERC now required a complainant challenging the increase of rates
due to inflation to prove two things: "(1) that the pipeline is
substantially over-recovering its cost of service and (2) that the
indexed based increase so exceeds the actual increase in the
pipeline's cost that the resulting rate increase would substantially
exacerbate that over-recovery." Based on the re-clarification, the
FERC denied Tesoro's complaint. Subsequently, Tesoro petitioned
for review.
ANALYSIS: The Court first recognized that in order to seek
judicial review for a matter, the party seeking review must first raise
this issue with the appropriate agency. In this case, Tesoro may have
been able to get the result it wanted by re-raising the issue with the
FERC. Typically a party can avoid the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies for judicial review by showing several
situations, including: the suffering of irreparable harm; bias by the
agency; or the inability of the agency to grant equitable relief.
Tesoro's complaint was based on an order by the FERC, which at the
time was not final and also had not been repudiated.
Tesoro's last argument was that any further attempts to bring its
complaint before the FERC would be futile, as they knew that the
complaint would be denied. The court recognized that the most futile
arguments are brought by parties who can prove that the same
argument had been rejected by the specific agency in the past.
Tesoro brought its futility argument because the agency would most
likely reject that argument in the future. The Court does not want to
expand the realm of the futility argument here; instead, the Court
stated that the only time this argument can be successfully advanced
is when the applicable administrative remedies would be useless.
HOLDING: The Court upheld the FERC's denial of Tesoro's
complaint because Tesoro failed to exhaust all of its administrative
remedies. Tesoro must first make its complaint regarding the
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clarification order to the FERC, before the court can grant judicial
review.
IMPACT: This case shows that courts will not take a complaint
by a party against an administrative agency before the party has
exhausted all of its options with that particular agency. The court
makes it clear that even though situations may exist where there is
little hope that the complaint may be granted by the agency, the court
will not allow the complaining party to cut any corners. The
complaining party must still exhaust all of its avenues provided to it
by the applicable agency.

